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A methodology of comparative analysis of evolutionary models is proposed. The main aim of this
proposition is to identify to what extend different models can be called ‘evolutionary ones’. Each
model is analysed by searching for answers to following questions:
•  Is the model  dynamical one?
•  Is it focused on far-from-equilibrium analysis?
•  What are a unit of evolution and a unit of selection?
•  Is diversity and heterogeneity of economic agents and their behaviour observed?
•  Is search for innovation based on a concept of hereditary information (knowledge)?
•  What kinds of innovation does the model describe?
•  Does selection process lead to diversified rate of growth and spontaneity of development?
•  How economic agents set prices?
•  What kind of products are described by the model?
•  Are  decision making procedures and investment procedures present in the model?
Outline of selected schumpeterian models is accompanied by identification of crucial evolutionary
characteristics of each model and a short indication of phenomena explained by that model.
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Since publication of a seminal work by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter in 1982
evolutionary models proliferated enormously. After two decades of experience it is possible to
distinguish two main streams of development within an evolutionary modelling of economic
processes. The first one relates to the work of Schumpeter and the second one is based on the
concept of cellular automata and relates to a general framework of artificial life and Agent-
based Computational Economics (ACE). Intention of this short paper is to propose a
comparative analysis of selected models much more from technical point of view then to
make a review of evolutionary, neo-schumpeterian models (excellent reviews and surveys of
evolutionary models can be found in Dosi et al. (1988), Saviotti, Metcalfe (1991), Nelson2
(1995), Silverberg, Verspagen (1995)). Matter presented in this paper ought to be considered
as the first attempt to build a ‘comparative method (methodology)’ of proliferating
evolutionary models.
The paper will begin with short review of the models accompanied by identification of
crucial evolutionary characteristics of these models. All selected models are dynamical ones
so the first important feature to call them evolutionary ones is fulfilled by all selected models.
Similarly all models are focused on far-from-equilibrium analysis but it is interesting to see
to what extend this feature is really used in the process of simulation analysis of the models.
Other crucial features of evolutionary process are not present not in all models. The question
to what extend other ‘evolutionary features’ are present in the models will be the main aim of
this paper. The features which seem to be crucial to call a model an evolutionary one are:
diversity and heterogeneity of economic agents (firms) and their behaviour, search for
innovation based on a concept of hereditary information (knowledge), and selection
process which leads to diversified rate of growth and spontaneity of development. Interesting
question in relation to economic evolutionary models is presence of decision making
procedures. In many models that procedure  is not present in many others it has more or less
complicated form.
Although some models are rather new ones, most of them were developed in 1990s,
important question which ought to be stated is: what kind of phenomena (stylised facts) the
models explain or shed new light on them? The answer seems to be rather difficult but at least
some preliminary answer will be presented in the paper.
The easiest and the least controversial way of presentation would be to present the models
in chronological order but it would be nothing more then cataloguing the models. Looking in
the past history of Schumpterian tradition it seems possible to distinguish a few related but in
some way independent streams of modelling efforts. The first is very closely associated with
the work of Nelson and Winter (1982). To that tradition works of Winter (1984), Jonard,
Yildizoglu (1998, 1999), Winter, Kaniovski, Dosi (1997, 2000), and Yildizoglu (2001) can be
included. The other streams get inspirations from the work of Nelson and Winter but has
essential distinguishing features. The second stream of models can be called ‘Silverberg-
Verspagen models’. One distinguished feature of SV models is that technological progress is
embedded in vintage capital. In the model presented in Silverberg (1985) and Silverberg et al.
(1988) firms are self-financing using their cash and liquid interest bearing reserves. Idea that
firms rely on rather simple rules of thumb or routines rather than explicit optimisation
procedures is applied in models developed by Silverberg, Lehnert and Verspagen (Silverberg
and Lehnert, 1993; Silverberg, Verspagen, 1994, 1994a, 1995, 1995a). These models can be
seen as continuation of the work initiated by Gerald Silverberg in 1980s. The main difference
between the Silverberg and Verspagen (1995) model and the ones presented in Silverberg
(1985) and Silverberg and Lehnert (1993) is the way in which innovation is endogenized.
The third stream of models can be called ‘Dosi et al. models’, e.g., Chiaromonte and Dosi
(1993), Dosi et al. (1993, 1994, 1995). Dosi et al. approach is highly bottom-up simulation.
The aim of the authors seems to be to start from basic mechanisms of industrial development
without making any assumption about possible modelled properties of the system and to
obtain the well-known features (stylised facts) from the co-working of these basic
mechanisms of development. Similar assumption was made by Kwasnicki in his model of
industrial dynamics (Kwasnicka, Kwasnicki, 1992, 1996, Kwasnicki, 1994/1996, 2000). In a
sense the work of Kwasnicki can be considered as separate modelling effort.
There are also numerous models that can be identified as having ‘Schumpeterian flavour’.
The model presented by Andersen (1997) is based on Pasinetti’s scheme of the structural
economic dynamics of a labour economy with inclusion of an evolutionary, micro-economic
foundation. A proposition of Bruckner, Ebeling and Scharnhorst (1989), Bruckner, Ebeling,3
Jimenez Montano and Scharnhorst (1993) apply general n-dimensional birth-death transition
model to describe technological development. Models proposed by Stan Metcalfe (1993,
1994) and Paul Windrum and Chris Birchenhall, (1998) are also shortly described. The main
of this paper is to propose a methodology of comparative analysis of evolutionary models.
Because of  a natural limitation on the length of a paper, a large number of existing model
(e.g.,  Englmann (1994), Iwai (1984, 1984a), Nelson and Wolff (1997), Saviotti and Mani
(1993), and Verspagen (1991, 1993)) are not included in the analysis but proposed
methodology can be applied also to these models.
Nelson and Winter model
It seems natural that when we think about evolutionary modelling rooted in Schumpeterian
tradition we ought to start from the work of Nelson and Winter.
1 Nelson and Winter (NW)
models were worked out in 1970s and 1980s and summarised in their book, sometime called
‘bible of evolutionary economists’ (Nelson, Winter, 1982). Nelson and Winter models suit
frequently as a basis or a kind of pattern for inventing another evolutionary models. In NW
model and in almost all models of Schumpeterian tradition a firm is a basic unit of evolution
and also is a unit of selection.
2 Contrary to orthodox economics, concept of representative
agent is not present in evolutionary models. Usually the economy is disaggregated into
diverse individual firms influencing each other by nonlinear dynamic interactions describing
search for innovation, competition (selection) and investment. In most simulation models
agents use boundedly rational behavioural procedures. Learning and searching for innovation
are modelled by allowing for mutation and imitation rules operating on the firms’ operational
parameters. Mutations are usually local within the routine space. Nelson and Winter apply a
population perspective and they postulate that it is possible to specify the space in which
innovative search takes place.
The assumption of macroeconomic properties flowing from microeconomic behaviour of
economic agents (i.e. firms) is basic reason for necessity of using simulation to investigate
these models. The first model that will be discussed is the one presented in Nelson and Winter
(1982, ch. 9). This model can be seen also as the first evolutionary growth model.
The state of the evolutionary process of an industry at any moment t is described by the
capital stock and the behavioural rules of each firm. The state in the next moment (t+1) is
determined by the state in previous moment. In this growth model firms use production
techniques which are characterised by fixed labour and capital coefficients. Firms
manufacture homogeneous products, so the model describes only process innovation. It is
assumed that firms produce using a Leontief production function, therefore substitution
between labour and capital is not explicitly present in the model. Invention occurs as a result
of firms’ search activities. Firms search for new combinations of labour and capital
                                                
1  Many authors have programmed the Nelson-Winter model. Let us mention only three
implementations available through the Internet. One was done within the DRUIDIC (Dynamic
Reconstruction of Unfolding Industrial Diversity by Interactive Computing) project. The NW models
programmed in Maple V can be found in Esben Sloth Andersen homepage
(http://www.business.auc.dk/evolution/esa/). Murat Yildizoglu programmed the NW models in Java
(http://cournot.u-strasbg.fr/yildi/NelWin.htm). The NW model programmed by Bart Verspagen
(http://www.tm.tue.nl/ecis/bart/) accompanies a new textbook written by Verspagen (2001).
2 Distinguishing a unit of evolution and a unit of selection seems to be important. In biological
evolution an organism is a unit of evolution as well as a unit of selection. In ‘artificial’ evolution (as
e.g, knowledge evolution or industrial evolution) we observe a separation of these two aspects of
evolutionary processes.  The unit of evolution is an individual (knowledge evolution) or a firm
(industrial evolution) and the unit of selection is an idea, a theory or a product, a commodity, that is, a
result of efforts of the unit of evolution (Kwasnicki, 1994/1996).4
coefficient. Changes of these both coefficients are not correlated therefore a phenomenon that
resembles substitution between labour and capital may be observed in the simulated process.
Search activities are determined by satisfying behaviour, in a sense that a new technique is
adopted only if the expected rate of return is higher than the firm’s present rate of return. The
search process may take two different forms: local search (mutation) or imitation. In the first
case, firms search for new techniques, yet not present in the industrial practice. The term local
search indicates that each undiscovered technique has a probability of being discovered which
linearly declines with a suitably defined technological distance from the current technology.
Imitation allows particular firm to find techniques currently employed by other firms but not
yet used in its own production process. The probability of given technique imitation is
proportional to its share in output. It is assumed that if a firm is engaged in search it can use
only one type of the search. Selection of actually used type of search is a random event with a
fixed probability for each type. An additional source of novelty in the economy is entry by
new firms, which also search for innovation. Potential entrant enters the industry if it
discovers a production technique which promises a rate of return over 16% but it has still 0.25
probability that it actually enters the market. A value for initial capital stock of entering firm
is drawn randomly.
The rate of return on techniques is the main selection force in the NW model. A firm’s
investment in capital is equal to its profit diminished by a fixed fraction, which depends on
paid dividends and capital depreciation. A firm’s capital stock shrinks if profit of that firm is
negative. Therefore we have second selection force which imposes withdrawing firms from
the market if they do not pace of technological progress of its competitors.
To calibrate the above sketched model for the case of the Solow data on total factor
productivity for the United States in the first half of the twentieth century it was assumed that
firms produce homogenous product named GNP. Using that model, Nelson and Winter
address the question whether these time series of the calibrated model correspond in a broad
qualitative sense to the ones actually observed by Solow.
The most developed and documented NW model which deals with the evolution of the
production techniques and other behavioural rules of an industry producing a homogeneous
product is frequently named as “Schumpeterian competition” (Nelson, Winter, 1982, ch. 12;
Winter, 1984). A firm is a unit of evolution as well as a unit of selection in that model. As in
the formerly sketched model, a number of firms produce single homogenous product.
Techniques used by different firms differ in output per unit of capital, i.e. in capital
productivity A. All other technique factors, as e.g. return to scale and input coefficient are
assumed to be equal for all firms. Technical change (increase of the productivity of capital)
takes the form of process innovations and process imitations. Each firm chooses a technique
with the highest productivity out of the three possible techniques (i.e. currently used and
found through innovative and imitative processes). Probability that firms innovate or imitate
depends on R&D funds determined in proportion to the level of physical capital (respectively
rin, rim). Profit per unit of capital is calculated by including R&D costs as ordinary cost
elements. The maximum investment of a firm depends on current profit plus loans from the
banks (calculated in proportion to the profit). The firm’s desired investment is determined by
the unit costs, a mark-up factor influenced by the market share of the firm, and the rate of
depreciation. The investment process has no time-lags. By multiplying the capital stock with
the new level of productivity, we have the production capacity of the firms of the industry in
next period. Products price is not firm specific but is equal to all firms and flows from the
downward-sloping demand function to balance supply and demand. Investment decision of
each firm is based on investment function, which depends on the firm’s market share, price
elasticity of the demand function, firm’s unit profit and bank policy. Firms can take credit but
there is no procedure of repaying it.5
Winter (1984) presents an interesting elaboration of search activity and entry. Firms are
partitioned into two types: primarily innovative or imitative. It allows Winter to apply a
notion of technological regime  depending on whether the source of technical progress is
external to the firm (e.g., from public scientific knowledge bases) or from firms’ own
accumulated technological capabilities. These two regimes are named as the entrepreneurial
and the routinized. Specific parameters exogenously impose the type of investigated regime.
Because of stochastic factors related to the process of innovation-imitation search for
innovation and nonlinearities of the production-investment equations it is not possible to find
analytical solutions of NW models. It is also not possible to find stochastic characteristics of
this process, as e.g., average and standard deviation of firms’ production. The only way to
investigate these models is to use computer simulation techniques of random numbers
generation and get estimated values of general stochastic characteristics, or observe
peculiarities of any single realisation of the industrial process.
In original model R&D policy of each firm is rigid (in a sense that the percentage of capital
spend for innovation and imitation do not change in a course of time). In (Winter, 1984, and
in similar way in Verspagen, 2001) R&D policies of each firm adapt accordingly to the long-
run performance of the firm – if the performance is above the average performance of the
industry the policies are not changed but if it falls below the average performance it is
modified (with assumed probability) in such a way that there is tendency toward average
R&D industry spending for innovation and imitation.
A firm grows (or shrinks, in terms of its market share and long-run performance index)
accordingly to its profit (or loss) gained in each year (instant of time). A firm is withdrawn
from the market if its capital fall below assumed minimal capital or if its long-run
performance index falls below the assumed value. Firms can imitate and innovate. Improving
productivity of capital is the main aim of innovative process.
Phenomena explained: differences between entrepreneurial and routinized regimes. Skewed
distribution of firms’ size. Diversity of market shares of all incumbents at any moment of time
as well variability of the market shares of each firm in a course of time.
Murat Yildizoglu (2001) does interesting extension of the NW model where investment in
physical capital and investment in R&D procedures are essentially modified. Firms invest a
fraction of their gross profit on R&D (although there is minimal investment imposed, just to
‘keep live’ R&D potential). There are two types of firms, so called NWFirms (which invest
fixed proportion of their profit in R&D) and GenFirms, which learn (using individual genetic
algorithm procedure) and adjust their R&D strategies to the conditions of the industry. R&D
investment of GenFirms does not pay back immediately and each R&D strategy must be used
for many periods before proving its efficiency. The average gross profit rate in assumed
learning period gives the fitness of selected strategy. Because of financing R&D activity from
current profit, procedure of investment in physical capital is modified in Yildizoglu
proposition. Namely, capital investment results directly from the arbitrage of firms between
R&D investment and capital expansion – i.e., investment into new capital is equal to the
remaining part of profit after financing R&D activity. Yildizoglu has made numerous
simulation runs and two general findings can be drawn from the obtained results. First,
learning should not be ignored in models of industry dynamics, in other case performance of
industries and social welfare would be severely underestimated. Second, learning gives
competitive advantage and in general it can be said that learning firms dominate industry.
Modelling of production sphere in extension of the NW model by N. Jonard, and M.
Yildizoglu (1998, 1999) is very close to the Nelson and Winter (1982) model but technology
space is modified, namely all possible technologies are ordered in sequence and identified
with natural numbers. Firms devote resources to the systematic search for new production
possibilities and the random outcome of this search belongs to a technological trajectory with6
an intrinsic productivity level having a shape of logistic equation. In contrary to the NW
model, profit gain by each firm can accumulate and can capitalise with assumed interest rate.
Each firm devotes a fraction of its cash-flow to R&D activities plus minimal R&D investment
necessary to ‘keep alive’ R&D activities. R&D investment has permanent priority and if there
is no possible to finance it from current and cumulated profit a fraction of capital stock is sold
to cover this financing. Therefore the capital can be reduced not only by its natural
depreciation but also as the result of R&D activity.
Firms can innovate, namely, accordingly to the Poisson process a firm can ‘jump’ a
random number of technologies along assumed trajectory.  Average number of steps in the
Poisson process depends on R&D funds allocated by each firm to search through innovation.
Firms can also imitate, and the probability of imitation depends also on R&D funds.
Tendency to imitate neighbouring technologies (i.e. those less distanced) in present in the
model.
As the authors write, they strongly depart form Nelson and Winter (1982) investment
policy, making it more realistic. The firm can choose between investing into physical capital
and investing in financial market (what depends on expected returns on investment). Each
firm estimates relationship between physical capital investment and profit (via simple
regression) and takes this relationship into account in the investment decision process (by
taking into consideration expected profit in future). The firm expands its capacity as long as
the return on the capital investment exceeds the return on financial market.
Beside interaction of firms via a standard way through the market price authors also add
interaction through so called firms’ space, i.e. socio-economic network specifying trading
partners, participants to co-operative agreement, proximity in corporate culture or
geographical neighbourhood. It is assumed that the interaction structure takes the shape of
two-dimensional closed lattice, firms being described by pair of coordinates corresponding to
horizontal and vertical location. Imitative draw entails the acquisition of the highest
productivity technology in the neighbourhood of given firm. Because of localised learning
and limited diffusion, firms are heterogeneous in terms of technologies and productivities.
Selection process and nature of innovation are very similar in nature to the original NW
model.
Phenomena explained:  the way in which localised learning and externalities influence
industry dynamics; firms and technologies are highly diversified.
One of the most recent efforts of developing Nelson and Winter proposition of
evolutionary modelling is work done by S. Witner, Y. Kaniovsky and G. Dosi (Winter,
Kaniovski, Dosi, 1997 and 2000). The authors present a model which is a “baseline not
merely in the sense of a standard for comparison, but also as a starting point for future work”
(Winter, Kaniovski, Dosi, 1997). In the most general term the model encompasses a stochastic
system driven by the persistent random arrival of new firms and a systematic selection
process linking investments to realised profitability. In (Winter, Kaniovski, Dosi, 2000) three
versions of the model are presented. In the first version competitiveness of any firm is
ultimately determined by its capital per unit of output ai, i.e. inverse of original NW model
concept of the productivity of capital Ai.  In that version learning (innovation is observed only
in entering firms (only newcomers learn to improve the productivity of capital)). The
improvement is modelled by a random process with exponential tendency of productivity of
capital improvements (i.e. the ratio of productivity improvement has stochastic tendency to
decrease in the course of the productivity improvement, a kind of a law of diminishing
return).
As in the original model decreasing continuous demand function H impose uniform price
for all firms, i.e.,  ) ( t Q H p = , where Qt is total productive capacity of the industry.
Total gross investment per unit of capital for i-th firm is equal to  i t va Q H / ) ( λ where,7
λ – the share of the gross profit which does not leak out as the interest payment and
shareholder’s dividends (i.e. this parameter is a measure for the propensity to invest);
ν– price per unit of physical capital.
Taking into account the depreciation rate of the capital stock d, at the end of period t
capital of firm i is equal to:









If an incumbent firm’s capital drops below the assumed fraction of minimal capital for
entering firm then the firm is withdrawn from the industry (i.e., die, exit).
Therefore we can say that in the first version of the model learning is observed only in
entrants and no innovation are made by incumbents. Innovation in this verison is realted only
to improvement of productivity of capital. At any period a number of new firm enter the
market; for each entrant, level of capital per unit of output is randomly determined on a basis
of the highest productivity of capital attainable to newcomers in the industry at time t.
In the second version learning (innovation) concerns only labour productivity. Productivity
of capital (capital/output ratio for all firms) is kept at the constant level. Therefore the
competitiveness of a firm is determined by variable cost per unit of output. As in the first
version incumbents do not innovate, and the only source of innovation are entrants
(newcomers) who learn how to improve the productivity of labour (via random process in
similar mode as in the first version). Improvement of productivity of labour is visible in
decreasing variable cost per unit of labour, mi. Investment rule in the second version implies
that in the end of period t capital of firm i is equal to
)) 0 , ) ( max( 1 ( i t
i
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where C is capital per unit of output;  i t m Q H − ) ( is naturally the gross profit per unit of output
at t for firm i; λ is the share of the gross profit re-invested.
In the third version newcomers are allowed to innovate with respect to both capital and
labour efficiencies (the third version is analysed only through simulation study).
The models presented are in fact the NW model simplified to allow for formal
representation enabling analytical enquire of its properties. In both version asymptotic or
long-run behaviour properties of the industry are theoretically analysed – three theorems, one
lemma for the first version and two theorems and one lemma for the second version.
Simulation study of both models is also presented. The proposed approach could be
considered as a progress in evolutionary modelling of economic processes – at least from the
point of theoretical tractability of an evolutionary model. Great majority of evolutionary
models is studied only via computer simulation and only a few of them, those rather least
complex, are studied analytically to search for their more general properties. The model
proposed by Winter, Kaniovski and Dosi describes real phenomena at a satisfactory level  and
thanks to its proper formal representation it is possible to formulate its long-run properties e.g.
in a form of theorems.
Phenomena explained: Skewed firms size distribution. Life time distribution of firms.
Persistence of market turbulence (so called turbulence index is a measure of market shares
fluctuation of all firms present in the market and entering the market), persistent fluctuations
of aggregate characteristics of the industry development (price, production capacity, total
production, etc.)
Silverberg-Verspagen models
One distinguished feature of Silverberg and Verspagen (SV) models is that technological
progress is embedded in vintage capital. In the model presented in Silverberg (1985) and8
(Silverberg et al., 1988) firms are self-financing using their cash and liquid interest bearing
reserves. A firm is a unit of evolution but selection acts on products. There are no explicit
investment procedures but investment plan of each firm is based on its financial strength.
Capital growth depends on the amount of capital capacity scrapped and on a capacity
utilisation (there are no constraints on investment by firm’s profit or bank rules). Each firm’s
investment ability governs the realisation of the investment plan (Is it realised partly or in a
whole in the best available technology?). Concurrently to the investment process the oldest
vintage is continuously scrapped. Textbooks notions of “demand’ and “supply” are not
present in the model. Instead of it firms behaviour is placed in more realistic spaces of orders,
order backlog, delivery delay, rate of capacity utilization, shipment, etc. The current level of
production is constrained by firm’s maximum capacity and the production of each firm
depends on prime unit labour cost (i.e., an average over all capital vintages).
Market share equation, which form fundamental mathematical description of competitive
process, is formally identical to the equation first introduced into mathematical biology by
R.A. Fisher in 1930 and in last decades is used in a variety of context by Eigen, Schuster,
Ebeling, Feistel, and others. The equation differs from most biological applications ,,in that
the competitiveness parameters rather being constant or simple functions of other variables,
themselves change over time in complex ways in response to the strategies pursued by firms
and feedbacks from the rest of the system”. Market share equation has the following form:
i i
i f E E a
dt
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where:
fi – market share of firm i; Ei – competitiveness of products manufactured by firm i,  E  is
average competitiveness  ∑ =
i
i i f E E .
The competitiveness is a linear combination of logarithms of price of firm’s i products (pi)
and delivery delay (ddi).
i i i dd b p E ⋅ − − = ln
Silverberg proposes specific pricing policy, which describes a compromise between strict
cost-plus pricing (markup rule), and competitive advantage of a firm (the price increases if the
competitiveness is higher then average competitiveness and is reduced otherwise). This
represent a compromise between short and long term profitability targets. Each firm adjust its
products’ price through dynamical markup based on the equation:
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where pci and pi are log of mark up price (on unit prime cost) and log of market price,
respectively.
Experience acquired by individual firm during its development can “leak” out and became
available to the rest of the industry. Logistic equation describes learning dynamics and
through that way internal skill level of each firm evolves.
  From some point of view the model describes the process of diffusion of new technology
in the case in which a best practice technology is apparent to all agents. Standard methods of
investment policy guarantee diffusion of technical progress within the industry. Innovation
process exists in a form of learning dynamics embodied through so called “internal skill
level“ of each firm.
Silverberg model is a set of differential equations with discredited representation of vintage
capital in the computer implementation. It is highly nonlinear model, nonlinearity is present in
almost all differential equations. The replication equation of Fisher mode is itself nonlinear
but also its parameters (i.e. competitiveness) are function of price and delivery delay, which9
changes in turn are governed by a set of difference equations. The only way to investigate
properties of this model is making numerical simulation on the computer.
Phenomena explained by the model relates to diffusion of new technology  (best practice
technology is apparent to all agents) and “optimal” time to adopt new technology (two
technological trajectories representing at any time the maximum productivities attainable in
best practice vintages of respective technologies).  Both technologies are changing at some
rate but the second technology is always absolutely superior in productivity. Superior
technology is available at some moment of time.
Similar idea that firms rely on rather simple rules of thumb or routines rather than explicit
optimization procedures is applied in models developed by Silverberg, Lehnert and
Verspagen (Silverberg, Lehnert, 1993, 1993a; Silverberg, Verspagen, 1994, 1994a, 1994b,
1995, 1995a).
These models can be seen as continuation of the work initiated by Silverberg in 1980s.
Although a unit of evolution in this model is a firm but unit of selection is more related to a
technology than to a product. In this series of models firms undertake behavioural imitation
with increasing probability the more unsatisfactory their performance is. Contrary to the
former model worked by Silverberg, in the later models stochastic elements are present,
namely those related to innovation emergence. The main difference between the Silverberg
and Verspagen (1995) model and the ones presented in Silverberg (1985) and Silverberg and
Lehnert (1993) is the way in which innovation is endogenized. It is assumed that in each
discrete period, firms devote resources (R&D) to the systematic search for new production
possibilities (i.e., new types of capital).
Firms must determine how much to spend on R&D in relation to either their profits or their
sales. Technical change comes about as a result of the profit-seeking activities of each firm.
Therefore, as in almost all evolutionary models growth is endogenized. Such important
feature of modern industrial development as increasing returns, spillover and other
phenomena known from the economics of innovation are also included in some of these
models. Decision problem is considered in the context of bounded rationality – firms
(decision-makers) have only vague ideas about final consequences of their actions.
All a time a fixed number of firms operate in the economy and the models are constructed
around three basic blocks. The first block consists of equations for the rate of capital
accumulation, the diffusion of new technologies in the total capital stock of the firms, and the
real wage rate. The wage rate depends positively on the unemployment rate (in a fashion of
real Philips curve). Each firm has variable number of different types of capital that it utilises
to produce a homogenous product. New capital arises from the accumulation of profit (there is
possibility to finance a growth of one type capital by the profit gained form ‘activity’ of the
other type of capital). Each type of capital (vintage) is characterised by fixed technical
coefficients, c and a (i.e. capital coefficient and labour productivity, respectively). Capital
coefficient is assumed to be fixed thorough the economy and time, and labour productivity is
assumed to change under the influence of technical progress. Profit rate of given capital is
equal to  c a w / ) / 1 ( − .
Share of the labour force employed on each capital stock (called employment share)
changes dynamically in such a way that labour employed for each capital stock is proportional
to that capital and inverse to the labour productivity. Therefore selection mechanism generates
that technologies with above-average labour productivity (i.e., more profitable) engage more
employment (their employment shares increase) and concurrently below-average technologies
(backward) tend to vanish.
The equations describe how economy evolves with a given set of technologies. Selection
takes place either at levels of firms and technologies. The second block describes how new
technologies and firms are introduced into the economy. The last block describes the way of10
influence of the evolving economy and firm learning on the firms’ innovative behaviour.
Collective learning phenomena are present in this block.
Each firm has a variable number of different types of capital goods utilised in production.
Profit is the only source of capital accumulation. Innovation rate depends on R&D funds,
which consist of firm-specific portions of profit and sales. Profits gained from different
vintages of capital may be redistributed in such a way that more profitable types of capital
accumulate even faster and less profitable even slower, than would otherwise be the case.
Basic equations of firms’ dynamics describe the share of the labour force employed on
each capital stock. Production is assumed to be always equal to production capacity. It is
assumed that the ratio between R&D expenditures and R&D labour input is equal to a fraction
of the economy-wide labour productivity.
The wage rate is determined by the differential equation following the idea of Phillips
curve. Assumed Phillips curve ensures that real wages tend to track labour productivity in the
long run. The employment share equation describes how more profitable technologies (in
terms of their labour productivity) tend to increase their employment share, concurrently
backward technologies tend to vanish. The wage rate equation and the employment share
equation form a selection mechanism in the described economy. New technologies are
continuously introduced, that implies that all technologies, after an initial phase of market
penetration, will be eventually superseded from the production system. New type of capital
(vintage) is created each time an innovation occurs. Because of fixed labour productivity of
each vintage and increasing of real wages over time it happens that at some stage of
development every technology generate negative profits. It is assumed that these losses are
financed by an equivalent decrease of the capital stock. It means that losses imply capital
scrapping to cover the losses.
Entry of a new firm occurs only as a result of competition and an exit of an incumbent
firm. Exit occurs whenever a firm’s employment share falls below assumed threshold value.
Therefore exit of incumbent firms is completely endogenous and entry only occurs in case of
exit, so that the total number of firms is constant.
It can be said that the model describers closed economy with innovating firms, generating
technical change through specific learning mechanisms based on two genetic operators,
namely mutation and imitation. It is also assumed that the more profitable a firm is, the less
likely it will change its strategy by imitating another firm. If a firm has decided to imitate, the
probability of selection of another firm to imitate is proportional to its market share in output.
If neither imitation nor mutation occur, the firm simply retains its strategy from the previous
period.
At each period firms devote R&D resources to search for new production possibilities,
represented by new types of capital. Nature of this search process is stochastic. Each time an
innovation emerges, new type of assumed quantity of capital is generated with assumed
increase of its labour productivity compare to the best practice labour productivity of that
firm. Because of stochastic introducing more efficient vintages of capital by competitors, a
firm can be  withdrawn from the market because of its negative profit (it is assumed that the
loses are financed by an equivalent decrease of the capital stock, i.e. capital is scrapped).
Emergence of innovation for each firm is governed by a Poisson process with assumed
formula of arrival rate (the arrival rate depends on so called innovation potential function and
can be simple linear function of the potential or more sophisticated, non-linear, logistic
function).The innovation potential of each firm is determined by this firm R&D funds and
average R&D spending (averaged by market share weighting) – i.e., we observe two forms of
spillover effect – economy wide and firm-specific. Additionally, innovation potential is
augmented by a measure of its distance from the best practice frontier. R&D funds are11
modified randomly (with assumed distribution) what is called mutation, but also each firm
can imitate R&D strategy of other incumbent firms.
Phenomena explained: the bell shape of diffusion function of successive technologies;
phases of economic development (e.g. ‘mercantilism’ or ‘industrial revolutions’) can be
associated with different R&D strategies; convergence of firms’ R&D spending to the some
pattern through spontaneous process; well identified three stages of industry development
(strong concentration of the market, competitive stage with technical change slightly going
up, and the evolutionary steady state characterised by rapid technical change and a
competitive market); convergence of some indicators (e.g. GDP per capita related to the best
country (frontier) – simulated and real variables are characterised by very similar skewed
power spectrum density function.
Dosi et al. models
Complex phenomena observed in the SV models, generated, among others, by
interrelationship of large number of competing firms, numerous vintages of capital of each
firm, and nonlinearities and stochastic factors, cause that analytical tractability of these
models is impossible. Therefore the only way to deal with the models is computer simulation.
The same can be said about numerous models developed by Giovanni Dosi and his
collaborators, e.g., Chiaromonte and Dosi (1993), Dosi et al. (1993), Dosi et al. (1994), Dosi
et al. (1995).
An example of the family of these models is the model aimed to explain classical
phenomena of skewness of firms’ size distribution from an evolutionary point of view (Dosi
et al., 1993, 1995). They assume that an ‘industry’ is composed of several ‘sectors’, each
corresponding to particular technological and market regimes. Each ‘sector’ is composed of
‘micro sectors’ (i.e., groups of relatively homogenous products or technologies – learning,
changes in market shares, entry and exit occur within microsectors). Therefore it can be said
that unit of evolution is a microsector and unit of selection is a firm. Each firm is
characterised by its age (a), size (s), and competitiveness (e). A firm’s size and its
competitiveness depend on learning. The dynamic of the markets to which the firm belongs
influences also the firm’s size. The authors consider two archetypes of industrial development
named as ‘Schumpeter Mark I’ and ‘Schumpeter Mark II’, additionally they analyse also
‘Intemediate Regime’. Differences between those archetypes (regimes) lay mainly in nature
of innovation activity.
Competitiveness is positive real number, which reflects the technological and
organisational capabilities of each firm. Under ‘Schumpeter I’ the only sources of innovation
are newcomers. Incumbents never learn (i.e. their competitiveness is constant during their
lifetime) and a competitiveness of entrants at time (t+1) is
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∑ = j j f e e is the average competitiveness of incumbent, weighted with their market shares, g
(here and in below equations) is random variable drawn from a Poisson distribution; k and λ1
are parameters characterising entry barriers and levels of generically available opportunities
for innovations).
In ‘Schumpeter II’ learning by incumbents is highly cumulative and a growth of
competitiveness is governed by equations:












t h + + = +12
Competitiveness of newcomers (entering firms) changes in similar fashion as in
‘Schumpeter I’ although with different values of parameters.
In the ‘Intermediate Regime’ learning of incumbents goes in similar way as entrants and
their competitiveness changes accordingly to the equation:
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In any discrete period a random number of firms try to enter the market and concurrently
firms that do not perform well enough (i.e., their competitiveness is much below the average
competitiveness or their market share is very small) are withdraw from the market (i.e., thy
exit the industry).
Selection process influences market shares of all firms and the market shares of each firm
are governed by a the Fisher type replicator equation:
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i.e. market share of a firm grows if its competitiveness is higher then average and falls if is
below the average competitiveness in an microsector.
Market size of each microsector is not constant. It is assumed that there is limited lifetime
of the microsectors and the size of the microsector changes in a mode of ‘the bell shape
function’ with the maximum at the middle of the cycle. New microsectors are randomly born
with assumed distribution of time-span between the birth of new microsectors.
In ‘Schumpeter II’ firms can be ‘multi-product’ entities, i.e. can exploit their knowledge
across different microsectors via entry and acquisition of incumbent firms.
Phenomena explained: a bell shape of firms’ market shares over time, skewed distribution of
firm size, industry concentration variance according to different regimes, interfirm
asymmetries and turbulence (defined as variability of market share changes of all firms
operating on the market: ∑ − + | ) ( ) 1 ( | t f t f k k )
In the Chiaromonte and Dosi (1993) model, a firm is characterised by a single labour
coefficient. The pricing strategy is based upon firm-specific demand expectations. Two
important features characterise each firm, namely its technological capability (what is made in
the form of input coefficients), and economic strategies, which determines how much
resources the firm invest in the search for new technologies and what is products’ price.
The search process takes place in a two-dimensional space of ‘technological paradigms’
and labour coefficients. Firms either produce ‘machines’ (each of which is characterised by a
set of coordinates in the two dimensional plane), or they produce consumption goods (to
which they need machines as inputs). Therefore we can speak about two-sector economy. The
innovation process differs between these two sectors. In the first sector (producing capital
goods) the number of R&D workers determines the success of innovation. For given
innovation, the new capital good’s productivity is drawn randomly. In the consumption goods
sector, firms possess a skill level for each available capital good type. Learning process
contributes to increasing skill level. This learning process has both public and private features.
Correctness of firms’ prediction of their skill level is limited. Actual labour productivity is a
function of the capital good’s characteristics and the firm’s skill level. Selection of capital
good potentially employed by a firm from consumption sector is based on maximisation
‘utility’ function involving labour productivity, prices, and the order backlog.
Competitiveness of a firm depends on products prices and unfulfilled demand in the previous
period (the backlog of orders).
Similarly in (Dosi at al., 1994) model a firm is characterised by a single labour coefficient
but the search space is more similar to the one in Nelson and Winter model. Unit of evolution
in this model is sector with homogenous products and a unit of selection is a firm. The13
probability of an innovation depends on R&D employment. Increase of productivity of labour
force is possible through imitation and innovation. The probability of innovation (and
imitation) depends on investment in search, which is measured by current and lagged number
of searching workers (researchers). In case of success of innovation activity a productivity of
successful firm is increased with assumed increment rate.
New techniques can be imitated but with search cost. Probability of imitation depends also
on a number of workers engaged in imitative search. Learning is ‘local’ and knowledge is
partly tacit, therefore a firm imitate less distanced techniques eager (with higher probability)
then far distanced techniques (distance is measured by difference between productivity used
by that firm and productivity of technique potentially to be imitated).
Out of these three techniques, i.e., current technique applied by the firm, techniques gained
by imitation and innovation, a firm selects technique with maximum productivity.
Labour is the only input in both search and production. Number of workers engaged in
search for imitation and for innovation depends on R&D funds allocated by a firm (which is a
constant share of firm’s previous-period turnover) and current wage level of a country where
the firm operates.
Price is determined in two-stage process. First, the ‘desired ‘ price is calculated on a basis of
mark-up procedure, in relation to the wage level in the current and the previous period and the
firm’s productivity coefficient. In the second stage, the actual price variation by each firm on
its own domestic market is computed (the price variation depends in logarithmic way on the
actual price of the firm, the markup price calculated in the first stage, desired market share
and market shares in two previous moments).
Prices and exchange rate determine the competitiveness of each firm in each market, i.e.,










where ρj is the exchange rate of country j, and pij is price of firm i in country j. Through that
way technological competence (labour productivity), wages, pricing rules contribute to
competitiveness formation.
A domestic demand of each country depends on total earned wages by workers in that
country (i.e., is equal to sum all wages earned by all workers in all sectors of the country).
Demand is distributed among individual producers (both domestic and foreign) accordingly to
their relative competitiveness (i.e., calculated as multiplication of market share of given firm
on specific market by the overall demand for that product on that market)
It is assumed that firms produce as demand indicate but under the condition that the
demand does not exceed calculated from year to year credit-constrained maximum growth of
a firm. Market share dynamics of firm i in market k is calculated using replicator equation in a
form:
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k is the average competitiveness and a11 is parameter controlling ‘selectiveness’ of the
market.
The market shares (the replication equation) are translated into actual production levels by
considering the size of the aggregate market, which is endogenous to the model. The total size
of the market is the minimum of aggregate demand and supply. Demand for labour to be
employed in production by firm i is just the real output divided by labour productivity of the
firm.14
A firm exit the market (die) if its market share falls below assumed critical level. Dead
firms are replaced by new entrants with initial productivity equal to average productivity in
the sector in the country where birth occurs, plus a white noise.
Phenomena explained: Preliminary observations of aggregate dynamics and national accounts
(as e.g. national income at constant prices, exports, imports, wage dynamic) are isomorphic to
the ‘stylised facts’ of real open economies development.
Dosi et al. approach is highly bottom-up simulation. The aim of the authors seems to be to
start from basic mechanisms of industrial development without making any assumption about
possible modelled properties of the system and to obtain the well-known properties (stylised
facts) from the co-working of these basic mechanisms of development. Similar assumption
was made by Kwasnicki in his model of industrial dynamics (Kwasnicka, Kwasnicki, 1992,
Kwasnicki, 1994/1996).
Kwasnicki’s model
This model describes the behaviour of a number of competing firms producing functionally
equivalent, but not homogeneous, products. A unit of evolution is a firm and a unit of
selection is a product. One of the distinguished features of the model is the coupling of
technological development and economic processes. A firm is characterised by a set of
routines applied by the firm. In order to improve its position in the industry and in the market,
each a firm searches for new routines and new combinations of routines (innovation) to
reduce the unit costs of production, increase the productivity of capital, and to improve the
competitiveness of its products in the market. Each firm may simultaneously produce
products with different prices and different values of the characteristics, i.e., the firm may be a
multi-unit operation. Different units of the same firm manufacture products by employing
different sets of routines.
Simulation of industry development is done in discrete time in four steps:
(1) Search for innovation (i.e., search for new sets of routines, which potentially may replace
the old set currently employed by a firm).
(2) Firms’ decision making process (calculation and comparison of investment, production,
net income, profit, and some other characteristics of development which may be attained
by employing the old and the new sets of routines. Decisions of each firm on: (a)
continuation of production by employing old routines or modernizing production, and (b)
opening (or not) of new units).
(3) Entry of new firms.
(4) Selling process (market evaluation (selection) of the offered pool of products; calculation
of firms’ characteristics: production sold, shares in global production and global sales, total
profits, profit rates, research funds, etc).
Technological change is endogenized and the probability of finding an innovation (new set
of routines) depends on the R&D funds allocated to in-house research (‘mutation’) and
imitation. There are two types of routines: active, that is, routines employed by the firm in its
everyday practice, and latent, that is, routines which are stored by the firm but not actually
applied. Latent routines may be included in the active set of routines at a future time. The set
of routines employed by a firm may evolve. There are four basic mechanisms for generating
new sets of routines, namely: mutation, recombination, transition and transposition.
On the basis of its expectations of future market development and expected decisions of its
competitors, each firm decides on the price of its products, investment and the quantity of
production which it expects to sell on the market. Inclusion of the element of expectations in
the decision making process makes it boundedly rational. Current investment capability and
the possibility of credit taking are also considered by each firm. In establishing the product15
price and future level of production firms take into account short term elements (profit
increasing) and long term elements (to be present on the market as long as possible).
The productivity of capital, variable costs of production and product characteristics are the
functions of routines employed by a firm. Each routine has multiple, pleiotropic effects, that
is, it may affect many characteristics of products, as well as productivity, and the variable
costs of production. Similarly, the productivity of capital, unit costs of production and each
characteristic of the product can be function of a number of routines (polygeneity).
Attractiveness (competitiveness) of the product on the market depends on the values of the
product characteristics and its price. The competitiveness of products with characteristics z
and price p is equal to
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where q(t,z) is the technical competitiveness, z a vector of product characteristics, and α price
elasticity. Products with better products characteristics and lower price are preferred by
consumers. The selection equation of the competition process describes changes of the firms’
shares in global output.
The selection equation describing competition among firms (products) in the market has
the following form (fi is the market share of products manufactured by firm i):
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where c(t) is the average competitiveness of products offered for sale,
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This means that the share (fi) of firm i is growing if its competitiveness is higher then the
average competitiveness and is decreasing if product performance is below the average within
the industry. The product competitiveness can be improved by offering technologically better
products (what is done through introducing innovations) or by lowering the price.
The model is rooted in the tradition established by Nelson and Winter. The main
similarities to the NW model lay in the concept of routines and endogenized innovations.
Important departures of this model from the NW model consist of a more realistic concept of
innovation covering product and process innovations, diversity of price (there is no uniform
price for all firms but firms individually decide about the price), inclusion in the decision
making module the concept of agents expectations (on future market behaviour and decisions
of other competitors).
Phenomena explained: Textbook properties of industry development (profit and
concentration level of the industry; high industry concentration when economy of scale is
present, higher profit for expanding market, etc.). Objectives of firms – ‘maximizers vs.
satisfiers’. Diversity of price and heterogeneity of products; innovation and temporal
monopoly of the pioneer firm (Schumpeter’s temporary monopoly), skewed distributions of
business firms’ size, path-dependence and cumulative causation, industry turbulence; industry
development along different innovation regimes.
Other models
Firm is a unit of evolution as well as unit of selection in a model worked out by Metcalfe
(1993, 1994). The model is based on the Downie (1958) concept of competing firms within
evolutionary frame. Growth rate of each firm is proportional to its unit profit, i.e.,
) ( i i i h p f g − = , where p is price (given exogenously for the industry), hi is unit cost level of
firm i, and fi is propensity to accumulate (i.e., the fraction of profit reinvested, divided by the16
common output:capital ratio). Downie assumed that the propensity to accumulate is common
for all firms (in fact he considered a case of  two competing firms). Downie identified two
reasons for differences in propensity to accumulate, namely differential ability to borrow in
the capital market and differential capital:output ratios between the firms. Metcalfe adds
managerial differences in the willingness and ability to expand the firm; for example, the
economic life of less efficient firms is prolonged if a more efficient firm has the greater
capital:output ratio, or is less willing to growth.
Competitive process differs in Metcalfe approach in that it is not one dimensional (as in
Downie) but two dimensional, namely associated with fi  and  hi. Such proposition of
evolutionary (although it seems that self-organisational would be the better word) description
of competitive process leads Metcalfe to numerous proposition of interesting properties of this
process  (e.g. those related to the famous Fisher principle).
Metcalfe considers more general case then that proposed by Downie (e.g., there is more
then two firms).   A market share (si) of profitable firms (p>hi) is equal:
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where gs is the aggregate growth rate of output:
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propensities to accumulate.
Because of mentioned two dimensionality of competitive process, it is no longer true that a
firm with below average unit costs is necessary increasing its market share. By analysing
dynamics of the whole process, rather then focusing on individual firms, the author calculates
averaged behaviour, expressed, e.g., in terms of rates of change of the moments of the joint
distribution of f and h.
There are no decision procedures, values of unit costs and propensities to accumulate are
the model’s parameters. Selection process takes the form of replicator equation (similar to that
proposed by Fisher).
Phenomena explained: changes in the average behaviour in a group of firms are connected in
a precise way to measures of the variety in behaviour across that group (analogy to the
Fisher’s principle). Deeper understanding of patterns of growth and accumulation to which
competition is central phenomenon.
A two-population model that comprises a population of firms and a population of
consumers, which adapt to and learn about preferences of each other is presented by Paul
Windrum and Chris Birchenhall (Windrum, Birchenhall, 1998). The adaptive learning is
mediated by the technological designs that are traded in the market. A unit of evolution is a
firm and a unit of selection is a product design.
Selection process acts through adaptive learning of both populations. The main feature of
the model is that it simulates interaction of a number of consumers (partitioned into a number
of types) and producers (firms). In each period the following sequence is repeated:
-  consumers allocate their purchases across the firms (out of firms’ offer of sale which
consist of maximum quantity of goods and their prices);
-  population of consumers replicates;
-  firms make adjustment of their offer.
Each consumer will attempt to buy the most attractive offer if this offer is better than the
option named ‘not buying’ (if there is no stock available a consumer tries to buy the second17
best, etc). A consumer of type i is characterised by a quantity of money mi and a utility
function of the form:
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where x is the characteristic vector of a good and p is the price of the good; v is the indirect
utility of money that can be obtained in other markets (this function has a constant form); w(x)
is the direct utility of consuming the good with characteristic vector x.
Distribution of consumers across the set of types is governed by a form of replicator
equation in such a way that proportion (share) of type i consumers grows in proportion to the
utility attained by that type (related to the maximum value of the utility at current time t).
After trading, the firms adjust their offer by modifying prices and quantities produced.
Price markup and target market shares are fixed in the model so the only task is to adjust the
firm’s capacity and level of production. Adjustment of the capacity depends on a firm’s
profits (and losses). Real production is minimum of two values: a firm’s capacity and a firm’s
target level of production. Investment of a firm depends on the wealth of the firm, which is
defined as all collected profits (or losses) of that firm during its life.
Firms can innovate, i.e. can modify products characteristics x (each characteristics can
mutate with given probability, and if it mutates, characteristics values are randomly changed
accordingly to assumed normal distribution). The firm compares the mutated design with the
old design and allows the mutated design to be put into production if it is assessed to be
improvement. A kind of imitation of existing designs is present in the model, it takes a form
of transfer of values of selected number of characteristics from randomly selected firm to that
being ‘under imitation procedure’. The transfer is accepted if it improves the utility of target
consumer type.  We can say that the innovation type present in the model is a product
innovation embodied in its design.
Phenomena explained: emergence of the dominant design (as explained by the cycle theory of
innovation) – but the emergence of a single design within a single niche market is a special
case of the more general problem presented in the paper and there are possible another market
outcomes. Evolving consumer preferences (ignored in the traditional product life cycle)
significantly influence direction of technological innovation.
Andersen (1997) presents a model based on Pasinetti’s scheme of the structural economic
dynamics of a labour economy with inclusion of an evolutionary, micro-economic foundation.
The model describes the evolution of an economic system with a varying number of sectors,
each of which is producing a different consumption good. The essence of this model is the
assumption that consumers have a hierarchy of goods, and they consume a higher-order good
when they are fully provided with the lower-order goods. Labour and knowledge are basic
production factors. Innovative process allows firms to increase their productivity with respect
to individual goods. Therefore in the long-term perspective labour becomes available for the
production of new consumption goods. The hierarchy of goods and the assumption about
sequential fulfilment causes the emergence of “technological unemployment, which emerges
if goods are not provided to a sufficient degree”. Slow productivity development in the
production of new goods leads to a slowdown in the overall rate of growth, and it can occur
irrespectively of productivity growth in old sectors. To raise long-term growth the concept of
“anticipatory R&D” is introduced.
A micro-based simulation model of national economy, which integrates micro activities,
was, developed by Gunnar Eliasson (Eliasson, 1985, 1989). The project of micro-to-macro
model was initiated in 1975 and was calibrated to describe the development of the Swedish
economy. Firms and household are the basic units of the model. It is not a fully evolutionary
model, but contains some evolutionary features and Schumpeterian innovative behaviour.18
Technical change is introduced at the firm level through new investment. The decisions of
firms’ managers are mathematically modelled by a search process for proper decisions based
on a trail and error procedure. To be closer to reality the principle of ‘maintain or improve
profit’ (MIP) is included in the submodel describing the behaviour of a firm. Long-term
investment decisions and short-term production search are also included in the submodel of a
firm’s behaviour. Long-term economic development primarily depends on the capital market.
Investment and growth of potential capacity at the micro level is driven by the difference
between the perceived rate of return of the firm and the interest rate.
Another approach to describe innovation processes is proposed by Bruckner, Ebeling,
Jimenez Montaño and Scharnhorst (1993). They start from observation of physicists that
“relationship between micro- and macro-level descriptions become important and led to
questions of fundamental relevance” and that “relatively independent of the nature of the
subsystems mainly the manner of their coordination is important for the demonstration of the
well-known macroscopic phenomena of spontaneous structure formation.” The authors apply
general n-dimensional birth-death transition model to describe technological development. It
is assumed that firms contain different plants using different technologies. In general term, the
system is described by a number of fields (which in a case of technological process are
production units used by different firms applying specific technology i). Elementary process
of self-reproduction, spontaneous generation, self amplification (i.e. non-linear self-
reproduction), sponsoring, error reproduction, cooperative and non-cooperative exchange,
spontaneous decline and self-inhibition is a base theoretical concept of the model.
Development of the system is described by a Master Equation system defining probability
distribution of technologies.
Summary
Last 20 years of evolutionary modelling in economics surely can be named as the period of
great radiation. One can find analogy to periods of great species radiation in biological
evolution. Two main streams of research, already mentioned, are the Schumpeterian tradition
and Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE). Within each stream proliferation of
models is enormous but still there is open question if out of these efforts a single paradigm
will emerge or a few independent straits of research will coexist.
In Table 1 a summary of comparative analysis of selected Schumpeterian models is
presented. There are numerous traits suitable to compare these models, among them are: units
of evolution and selection, type of firms modelled, explicitness of presence of decision
procedures and investment rules, how selection is modelled, what is a nature of innovation,
how price is set, and what kind of products are considered.
In most models firm is a unit of evolution as well as a unit of selection, in some other
models product is treated as unit of selection and firm as unit of evolution. Concerning type of
modelled firms, there are two approaches: treat a firm as one unit operation (in such case
introduced innovation transforms a whole firm) or treat a firm as multi-unit operation. In the
second case there are also two methods of modelling: each innovation is associated with new
vintage of capital or radical innovation is introduced in a new, relatively small, separate unit
(a kind of daughter-unit; incremental innovations transforms ‘mother-unit).
Decision procedures (rules) are distinguished feature of human activity and surely are
present in all evolutionary models but in many models the presence of this procedures is
implicit. In a model with explicit decision rules they relates mainly do R&D process (how
much to spend, should R&D financing be rigid or flexible (adaptable, learning), how much
spend for innovation (in-house research) and for imitation, etc.). In some models the decisions
on level of investment, production and price are explicitly modelled. Sometime they have a19
rather sophisticated form in which decisions on specific values of investment, production
and/or price are made in highly interactive and iterative way instead of rather simple
mathematical formulas.
Crucial features of evolutionary models are selection mechanism and innovation nature of
modelled process. There is no common way of modelling selection process. In roughly half
analysed models selection is modelled using different forms of a replicator equation. In some
models the selection goes via price mechanism (price is set as uniform for all firms, the price
and different cost of production generate diversified profit which in turn governs investment
abilities of firms and through this way generates variety of grow rates of modelled firms).
Spectrum of modelled types of innovation is really enormous. Some of them can be identified
with traditional process and product innovations, and are related to increase of efficiency of
capital use (increase of productivity of capital), diminishing unit cost of production (e.g.,
labour productivity improvement) or improving products performance (e.g., design
improvement). In some other models they have a form of internal skill improvement or simply
improvement of ‘abstract’ competitiveness index.
The last features enclosed in Table 1 is price setting and a nature of modelled products.
Price can be set exogenously (and keep constant), calculated from marked demand function
and set as uniform price for all products of all firms, or price can be set by firms individually
and can be firm specific. Price setting procedure is closely related with type of products
modelled. If products are homogenous the price is usually uniform for all firms but if there is
heterogeneity of products (and they differ e.g. in their technical characteristics) then price is
firm specific (diversity of price accompanied with heterogeneity of products are observed,
what makes that the models are closer to reality).
There is diversity of phenomena explained by different models. This characteristic is not
presented in Table 1 but some of them were indicated in the paper in the end of description of
each model.
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rule via current profit
gained
through price
mechanism;
investment
constraints lead to
capital grows or
scrapping
capital productivity or
labour productivity
improvement (entering
firms only)
uniform for all
firms
homogenous